Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Moran
Request for Comments: 9019 H. Tschofenig
Category: Informational Arm Limited
ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Brown
Linaro
M. Meriac
Consultant
April 2021
A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things
Abstract
Vulnerabilities in Internet of Things (IoT) devices have raised the
need for a reliable and secure firmware update mechanism suitable for
devices with resource constraints. Incorporating such an update
mechanism is a fundamental requirement for fixing vulnerabilities,
but it also enables other important capabilities such as updating
configuration settings and adding new functionality.
In addition to the definition of terminology and an architecture,
this document provides the motivation for the standardization of a
manifest format as a transport-agnostic means for describing and
protecting firmware updates.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conventions and Terminology
2.1. Terms
2.2. Stakeholders
2.3. Functions
3. Architecture
4. Invoking the Firmware
4.1. The Bootloader
5. Types of IoT Devices
5.1. Single MCU
5.2. Single CPU with Partitioning between Secure Mode and Normal
Mode
5.3. Symmetric Multiple CPUs
5.4. Dual CPU, Shared Memory
5.5. Dual CPU, Other Bus
6. Manifests
7. Securing Firmware Updates
8. Example
9. IANA Considerations
10. Security Considerations
11. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Firmware updates can help to fix security vulnerabilities, and
performing updates is an important building block in securing IoT
devices. Due to rising concerns about insecure IoT devices, the
Internet Architecture Board (IAB) organized the Internet of Things
Software Update (IoTSU) Workshop [RFC8240] to take a look at the
bigger picture. The workshop revealed a number of challenges for
developers and led to the formation of the IETF Software Updates for
Internet of Things (SUIT) Working Group.
Developing secure IoT devices is not an easy task, and supporting a
firmware update solution requires skillful engineers. Once devices
are deployed, firmware updates play a critical part in their life-
cycle management, particularly when devices have a long lifetime or
are deployed in remote or inaccessible areas where manual
intervention is cost prohibitive or otherwise difficult. Firmware
updates for IoT devices are expected to work automatically, i.e.,
without user involvement. Conversely, non-IoT devices are expected
to account for user preferences and consent when scheduling updates.
Automatic updates that do not require human intervention are key to a
scalable solution for fixing software vulnerabilities.
Firmware updates are done not only to fix bugs but also to add new
functionality and to reconfigure the device to work in new
environments or to behave differently in an already-deployed context.
The manifest specification has to allow the following:
* The firmware image is authenticated and integrity protected.
Attempts to flash a maliciously modified firmware image or an
image from an unknown, untrusted source must be prevented. This
document uses asymmetric cryptography in examples because it is
the preferred approach by many IoT deployments. The use of
symmetric credentials is also supported and can be used by very
constrained IoT devices.
* The firmware image can be confidentiality protected so that
attempts by an adversary to recover the plaintext binary can be
mitigated or at least made more difficult. Obtaining the firmware
is often one of the first steps to mounting an attack since it
gives the adversary valuable insights into the software libraries
used, configuration settings, and generic functionality. Even
though reverse engineering the binary can be a tedious process,
modern reverse engineering frameworks have made this task a lot
easier.
Authentication and integrity protection of firmware images must be
used in a deployment, but the confidential protection of firmware is
optional.
While the standardization work has been informed by and optimized for
firmware update use cases of Class 1 devices (according to the device
class definitions in RFC 7228 [RFC7228]), there is nothing in the
architecture that restricts its use to only these constrained IoT
devices. Moreover, this architecture is not limited to managing
firmware and software updates but can also be applied to managing the
delivery of arbitrary data, such as configuration information and
keys. Unlike higher-end devices, like laptops and desktop PCs, many
IoT devices do not have user interfaces; therefore, support for
unattended updates is essential for the design of a practical
solution. Constrained IoT devices often use a software engineering
model where a developer is responsible for creating and compiling all
software running on the device into a single, monolithic firmware
image. On higher-end devices, application software is, on the other
hand, often downloaded separately and even obtained from developers
different from the developers of the lower-level software. The
details for how to obtain those application-layer software binaries
then depend heavily on the platform, the programming language used,
and the sandbox in which the software is executed.
While the IETF standardization work has been focused on the manifest
format, a fully interoperable solution needs more than a standardized
manifest. For example, protocols for transferring firmware images
and manifests to the device need to be available, as well as the
status tracker functionality. Devices also require a mechanism to
discover the status tracker(s) and/or firmware servers, for example,
using preconfigured hostnames or DNS-based Service Discovery (DNS-SD)
[RFC6763]. These building blocks have been developed by various
organizations under the umbrella of an IoT device management
solution. The Lightweight Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol
[LwM2M] is one IoT device management protocol.
However, there are several areas that (partially) fall outside the
scope of the IETF and other standards organizations but need to be
considered by firmware authors as well as device and network
operators. Here are some of them, as highlighted during the IoTSU
workshop:
* Installing firmware updates in a robust fashion so that the update
does not break the device functionality of the environment in
which this device operates. This requires proper testing and
offering of recovery strategies when a firmware update is
unsuccessful.
* Making firmware updates available in a timely fashion considering
the complexity of the decision-making process for updating
devices, potential recertification requirements, the length of a
supply chain an update needs to go through before it reaches the
end customer, and the need for user consent to install updates.
* Ensuring an energy-efficient design of a battery-powered IoT
device; a firmware update, particularly radio communication and
writing the firmware image to flash, is an energy-intensive task
for a device.
* Creating incentives for device operators to use a firmware update
mechanism and to require its integration from IoT device vendors.
* Ensuring that firmware updates addressing critical flaws can be
obtained even after a product is discontinued or a vendor goes out
of business.
This document starts with a terminology list followed by a
description of the architecture. We then explain the bootloader and
how it integrates with the firmware update mechanism. Subsequently,
we offer a categorization of IoT devices in terms of their hardware
capabilities relevant for firmware updates. Next, we talk about the
manifest structure and how to use it to secure firmware updates. We
conclude with a more detailed example of a message flow for
distributing a firmware image to a device.
2. Conventions and Terminology
2.1. Terms
This document uses the following terms:
Firmware Image:
The firmware image, or simply the "image", is a binary that may
contain the complete software of a device or a subset of it. The
firmware image may consist of multiple images if the device
contains more than one microcontroller. Often, it is also a
compressed archive that contains code, configuration data, and
even the entire file system. The image may consist of a
differential update for performance reasons.
The terms "firmware image", "firmware", and "image" are used in
this document and are interchangeable. We use the term
"application firmware image" to differentiate it from a firmware
image that contains the bootloader. An application firmware
image, as the name indicates, contains the application program
often including all the necessary code to run it (such as protocol
stacks and an embedded operating system (OS)).
Manifest:
The manifest contains metadata about the firmware image. The
manifest is protected against modification and provides
information about the author.
Microcontroller:
A microcontroller unit (MCU) is a compact integrated circuit
designed for use in embedded systems. A typical microcontroller
includes a processor, memory (RAM and flash), input/output (I/O)
ports, and other features connected via some bus on a single chip.
The term "system on chip" (SoC) is often used interchangeably with
MCU, but MCU tends to imply more limited peripheral functions.
Rich Execution Environment (REE):
An environment that is provided and governed by a typical OS
(e.g., Linux, Windows, Android, iOS), potentially in conjunction
with other supporting operating systems and hypervisors; it is
outside of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). This
environment and the applications running on it are considered
untrusted.
Software:
Similar to firmware but typically dynamically loaded by an OS.
Used interchangeably with firmware in this document.
System on Chip (SoC):
An SoC is an integrated circuit that contains all components of a
computer, such as the CPU, memory, I/O ports, secondary storage, a
bus to connect the components, and other hardware blocks of logic.
Trust Anchor:
A trust anchor, as defined in RFC 6024 [RFC6024], represents an
authoritative entity via a public key and associated data. The
public key is used to verify digital signatures, and the
associated data is used to constrain the types of information for
which the trust anchor is authoritative.
Trust Anchor Store:
A trust anchor store, as defined in [RFC6024], is a set of one or
more trust anchors stored in a device. A device may have more
than one trust anchor store, each of which may be used by one or
more applications. A trust anchor store must resist modification
against unauthorized insertion, deletion, and modification.
Trusted Applications (TAs):
An application component that runs in a TEE.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs):
An execution environment that runs alongside of, but is isolated
from, an REE. For more information about TEEs, see [TEEP-ARCH].
2.2. Stakeholders
The following stakeholders are used in this document:
Author:
The author is the entity that creates the firmware image. There
may be multiple authors involved in producing firmware running on
an IoT device. Section 5 talks about those IoT device deployment
cases.
Device Operator:
The device operator is responsible for the day-to-day operation of
a fleet of IoT devices. Customers of IoT devices, as the owners
of IoT devices (such as enterprise customers or end users),
interact with their IoT devices indirectly through the device
operator via the Web or smartphone apps.
Network Operator:
The network operator is responsible for the operation of a network
to which IoT devices connect.
Trust Provisioning Authority (TPA):
The TPA distributes trust anchors and authorization policies to
devices and various stakeholders. The TPA may also delegate
rights to stakeholders. Typically, the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) or original design manufacturer (ODM) will act
as a TPA; however, complex supply chains may require a different
design. In some cases, the TPA may decide to remain in full
control over the firmware update process of their products.
User:
The end user of a device. The user may interact with devices via
the Web or smartphone apps, as well as through direct user
interfaces.
2.3. Functions
(IoT) Device:
A device refers to the entire IoT product, which consists of one
or many MCUs, sensors, and/or actuators. Many IoT devices sold
today contain multiple MCUs; therefore, a single device may need
to obtain more than one firmware image and manifest to
successfully perform an update.
Status Tracker:
The status tracker has a client and a server component and
performs three tasks:
1. It communicates the availability of a new firmware version.
This information will flow from the server to the client.
2. It conveys information about the software and hardware
characteristics of the device. The information flow is from
the client to the server.
3. It can remotely trigger the firmware update process. The
information flow is from the server to the client.
For example, a device operator may want to read the installed
firmware version number running on the device and information
about available flash memory. Once an update has been triggered,
the device operator may want to obtain information about the state
of the firmware update. If errors occurred, the device operator
may want to troubleshoot problems by first obtaining diagnostic
information (typically using a device management protocol).
We make no assumptions about where the server-side component is
deployed. The deployment of status trackers is flexible: they may
be found at cloud-based servers or on-premise servers, or they may
be embedded in edge computing devices. A status tracker server
component may even be deployed on an IoT device. For example, if
the IoT device contains multiple MCUs, then the main MCU may act
as a status tracker towards the other MCUs. Such deployment is
useful when updates have to be synchronized across MCUs.
The status tracker may be operated by any suitable stakeholder,
typically the author, device operator, or network operator.
Firmware Consumer:
The firmware consumer is the recipient of the firmware image and
the manifest. It is responsible for parsing and verifying the
received manifest and for storing the obtained firmware image.
The firmware consumer plays the role of the update component on
the IoT device, typically running in the application firmware. It
interacts with the firmware server and the status tracker client
(locally).
Firmware Server:
The firmware server stores firmware images and manifests and
distributes them to IoT devices. Some deployments may require a
store-and-forward concept, which requires storing the firmware
images and/or manifests on more than one entity before they reach
the device. There is typically some interaction between the
firmware server and the status tracker, and these two entities are
often physically separated on different devices for scalability
reasons.
Bootloader:
A bootloader is a piece of software that is executed once a
microcontroller has been reset. It is responsible for deciding
what code to execute.
3. Architecture
More devices than ever before are connected to the Internet, which
drives the need for firmware updates to be provided over the Internet
rather than through traditional interfaces, such as USB or RS-232.
Sending updates over the Internet requires the device to fetch the
new firmware image as well as the manifest.
Hence, the following components are necessary on a device for a
firmware update solution:
* The Internet protocol stack for firmware downloads. Firmware
images are often multiple kilobytes, sometimes exceeding one
hundred kilobytes, for low-end IoT devices and can even be several
megabytes for IoT devices running full-fledged operating systems
like Linux. The protocol mechanism for retrieving these images
needs to offer features like congestion control, flow control,
fragmentation and reassembly, and mechanisms to resume interrupted
or corrupted transfers.
* The capability to write the received firmware image to persistent
storage (most likely flash memory).
* A manifest parser with code to verify a digital signature or a
message authentication code (MAC).
* The ability to unpack, decompress, and/or decrypt the received
firmware image.
* A status tracker.
The features listed above are most likely provided by code in the
application firmware image running on the device rather than by the
bootloader itself. Note that cryptographic algorithms will likely
run in a trusted execution environment on a separate MCU in a
hardware security module or in a secure element rather than in the
same context as the application code.
Figure 1 shows the architecture where a firmware image is created by
an author and made available to a firmware server. For security
reasons, the author will not have the permissions to upload firmware
images to the firmware server and to initiate an update directly.
Instead, authors will make firmware images available to the device
operators. Note that there may be a longer supply chain involved to
pass software updates from the author all the way to the authorizing
party, which can then finally make a decision to deploy it with IoT
devices.
As a first step in the firmware update process, the status tracker
server needs to inform the status tracker client that a new firmware
update is available. This can be accomplished via polling (client
initiated), push notifications (server initiated), or more complex
mechanisms (such as a hybrid approach):
* Client-initiated updates take the form of a status tracker client
proactively checking (polling) for updates.
* With server-initiated updates, the server-side component of the
status tracker learns about a new firmware version and determines
which devices qualify for a firmware update. Once the relevant
devices have been selected, the status tracker informs these
devices, and the firmware consumers obtain those images and
manifests. Server-initiated updates are important because they
allow a quick response time. Note that in this mode, the client-
side status tracker needs to be reachable by the server-side
component. This may require devices to keep reachability
information on the server side up to date and the state at NATs
and stateful packet filtering firewalls alive.
* Using a hybrid approach, the server side of the status tracker
pushes update availability notifications to the client side and
requests that the firmware consumer pull the manifest and the
firmware image from the firmware server.
Once the device operator triggers an update via the status tracker,
it will keep track of the update process on the device. This allows
the device operator to know what devices have received an update and
which of them are still pending an update.
Firmware images can be conveyed to devices in a variety of ways,
including USB, Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART),
WiFi, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), low-power WAN technologies, mesh
networks and many more. At the application layer, a variety of
protocols are also available: Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and HTTP are the
most popular application-layer protocols used by IoT devices. This
architecture does not make assumptions about how the firmware images
are distributed to the devices and therefore aims to support all
these technologies.
In some cases, it may be desirable to distribute firmware images
using a multicast or broadcast protocol. This architecture does not
make recommendations for any such protocol. However, given that
broadcast may be desirable for some networks, updates must cause the
least disruption possible both in the metadata and firmware
transmission. For an update to be broadcast friendly, it cannot rely
on link-layer, network-layer, or transport-layer security. A
solution has to rely on security protection applied to the manifest
and firmware image instead. In addition, the same manifest must be
deliverable to many devices, both those to which it applies and those
to which it does not, without a chance that the wrong device will
accept the update. Considerations that apply to network broadcasts
apply equally to the use of third-party content distribution networks
for payload distribution.
+----------+
| |
| Author |
| |
+----------+
Firmware + Manifest |
+----------------------------------+ | Firmware +
| | | Manifest
| ---+------- |
| ---- | --|-
| //+----------+ | \\
-+-- // | | | \
----/ | ---- |/ | Firmware |<-+ | \
// | \\ | | Server | | | \
/ | \ / | | + + \
/ | \ / +----------+ \ / |
/ +--------+--------+ \ / | |
/ | v | \ / v |
| | +------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| | | Firmware | | | | | Device | |
| | | Consumer | | | | | Management | |
| | +------------+ | | | | | |
| | +------------+ | | | | +--------+ | |
| | | Status |<-+--------------------+-> | | | |
| | | Tracker | | | | | | Status | | |
| | | Client | | | | | | Tracker| | |
| | +------------+ | | | | | Server | | |
| | Device | | | | +--------+ | |
| +-----------------+ | \ | | /
\ / \ +----------------+ /
\ Network / \ /
\ Operator / \ Device Operator /
\\ // \\ //
---- ---- ---- ----
----- -----------
Figure 1: Architecture
Firmware images and manifests may be conveyed as a bundle or
detached. The manifest format must support both approaches.
For distribution as a bundle, the firmware image is embedded into the
manifest. This is a useful approach for deployments where devices
are not connected to the Internet and cannot contact a dedicated
firmware server for the firmware download. It is also applicable
when the firmware update happens via USB sticks or short-range radio
technologies (such as Bluetooth Smart).
Alternatively, the manifest is distributed detached from the firmware
image. Using this approach, the firmware consumer is presented with
the manifest first and then needs to obtain one or more firmware
images as dictated in the manifest.
The pre-authorization step involves verifying whether the entity
signing the manifest is indeed authorized to perform an update. The
firmware consumer must also determine whether it should fetch and
process a firmware image, which is referenced in a manifest.
A dependency resolution phase is needed when more than one component
can be updated or when a differential update is used. The necessary
dependencies must be available prior to installation.
The download step is the process of acquiring a local copy of the
firmware image. When the download is client initiated, this means
that the firmware consumer chooses when a download occurs and
initiates the download process. When a download is server initiated,
this means that the status tracker tells the device when to download
or that it initiates the transfer directly to the firmware consumer.
For example, a download from an HTTP/1.1-based firmware server is
client initiated. Pushing a manifest and firmware image to the
Package Resource of the LwM2M Firmware Update Object [LwM2M] is a
server-initiated update.
If the firmware consumer has downloaded a new firmware image and is
ready to install it, to initiate the installation, it may
* need to wait for a trigger from the status tracker,
* trigger the update automatically, or
* go through a more complex decision-making process to determine the
appropriate timing for an update.
Sometimes the final decision may require confirmation of the user of
the device for safety reasons.
Installation is the act of processing the payload into a format that
the IoT device can recognize, and the bootloader is responsible for
then booting from the newly installed firmware image. This process
is different when a bootloader is not involved. For example, when an
application is updated in a full-featured OS, the updater may halt
and restart the application in isolation. Devices must not fail when
a disruption, such as a power failure or network interruption, occurs
during the update process.
4. Invoking the Firmware
Section 3 describes the steps for getting the firmware image and the
manifest from the author to the firmware consumer on the IoT device.
Once the firmware consumer has retrieved and successfully processed
the manifest and the firmware image, it needs to invoke the new
firmware image. This is managed in many different ways depending on
the type of device, but it typically involves halting the current
version of the firmware, handing over control to firmware with a
higher privilege or trust level (the firmware verifier), verifying
the new firmware's authenticity and integrity, and then invoking it.
In an execute-in-place microcontroller, this is often done by
rebooting into a bootloader (simultaneously halting the application
and handing over control to the higher privilege level) then
executing a secure boot process (verifying and invoking the new
image).
In a rich OS, this may be done by halting one or more processes and
then invoking new applications. In some OSes, this implicitly
involves the kernel verifying the code signatures on the new
applications.
The invocation process is security sensitive. An attacker will
typically try to retrieve a firmware image from the device for
reverse engineering or will try to get the firmware verifier to
execute an attacker-modified firmware image. Therefore, firmware
verifier will have to perform security checks on the firmware image
before it can be invoked. These security checks by the firmware
verifier happen in addition to the security checks that took place
when the firmware image and the manifest were downloaded by the
firmware consumer.
The overlap between the firmware consumer and the firmware verifier
functionality comes in two forms, namely:
* A firmware verifier must verify the firmware image it boots as
part of the secure boot process. Doing so requires metadata to be
stored alongside the firmware image so that the firmware verifier
can cryptographically verify the firmware image before booting it
to ensure it has not been tampered with or replaced. This
metadata used by the firmware verifier may well be the same
manifest obtained with the firmware image during the update
process.
* An IoT device needs a recovery strategy in case the firmware
update/invocation process fails. The recovery strategy may
include storing two or more application firmware images on the
device or offering the ability to invoke a recovery image to
perform the firmware update process again using firmware updates
over serial, USB, or even wireless connectivity like Bluetooth
Smart. In the latter case, the firmware consumer functionality is
contained in the recovery image and requires the necessary
functionality for executing the firmware update process, including
manifest parsing.
While this document assumes that the firmware verifier itself is
distinct from the role of the firmware consumer and therefore does
not manage the firmware update process, this is not a requirement,
and these roles may be combined in practice.
Using a bootloader as the firmware verifier requires some special
considerations, particularly when the bootloader implements the
robustness requirements identified by the IoTSU workshop [RFC8240].
4.1. The Bootloader
In most cases, the MCU must restart in order to hand over control to
the bootloader. Once the MCU has initiated a restart, the bootloader
determines whether a newly available firmware image should be
executed. If the bootloader concludes that the newly available
firmware image is invalid, a recovery strategy is necessary. There
are only two approaches for recovering from invalid firmware: either
the bootloader must be able to select different, valid firmware or it
must be able to obtain new, valid firmware. Both of these approaches
have implications for the architecture of the update system.
Assuming the first approach, there are (at least) three firmware
images available on the device:
* First, the bootloader is also firmware. If a bootloader is
updatable, then its firmware image is treated like any other
application firmware image.
* Second, the firmware image that has to be replaced is still
available on the device as a backup in case the freshly downloaded
firmware image does not boot or operate correctly.
* Third, there is the newly downloaded firmware image.
Therefore, the firmware consumer must know where to store the new
firmware. In some cases, this may be implicit (for example,
replacing the least recently used firmware image). In other cases,
the storage location of the new firmware must be explicit, for
example, when a device has one or more application firmware images
and a recovery image with limited functionality, sufficient only to
perform an update.
Since many low-end IoT devices do not use position-independent code,
either the bootloader needs to copy the newly downloaded application
firmware image into the location of the old application firmware
image and vice versa or multiple versions of the firmware need to be
prepared for different locations.
In general, it is assumed that the bootloader itself, or a minimal
part of it, will not be updated since a failed update of the
bootloader poses a reliability risk.
For a bootloader to offer a secure boot functionality, it needs to
implement the following functionality:
* The bootloader needs to fetch the manifest from nonvolatile
storage and parse its contents for subsequent cryptographic
verification.
* Cryptographic libraries with hash functions, digital signatures
(for asymmetric crypto), and message authentication codes (for
symmetric crypto) need to be accessible.
* The device needs to have a trust anchor store to verify the
digital signature. Alternatively, access to a key store for use
with the message authentication code may be used.
* There must be an ability to expose boot-process-related data to
the application firmware (such as the status tracker). This
allows information sharing about the current firmware version and
the status of the firmware update process and whether errors have
occurred.
* Produce boot measurements as part of an attestation solution; see
[RATS-ARCH] for more information (optional).
* The bootloader must be able to decrypt firmware images in case
confidentiality protection was applied. This requires a solution
for key management (optional).
5. Types of IoT Devices
Today, there are billions of MCUs used in devices produced by a large
number of silicon manufacturers. While MCUs can vary significantly
in their characteristics, there are a number of similarities that
allow us to categorize them into groups.
The firmware update architecture, and the manifest format in
particular, needs to offer enough flexibility to cover these common
deployment cases.
5.1. Single MCU
The simplest and currently most common architecture consists of a
single MCU along with its own peripherals. These SoCs generally
contain some amount of flash memory for code and fixed data, as well
as RAM for working storage. A notable characteristic of these SoCs
is that the primary code is generally execute in place (XIP). Due to
the non-relocatable nature of the code, the firmware image needs to
be placed in a specific location in flash memory since the code
cannot be executed from an arbitrary location therein. Hence, when
the firmware image is updated, it is necessary to swap the old and
the new image.
5.2. Single CPU with Partitioning between Secure Mode and Normal Mode
Another configuration consists of a similar architecture to the one
previously discussed: it contains a single CPU. However, this CPU
supports a security partitioning scheme that allows memory and other
system components to be divided into secure and normal mode. There
will generally be two images: one for secure mode and one for normal
mode. In this configuration, firmware upgrades will generally be
done by the CPU in secure mode, which is able to write to both areas
of the flash device. In addition, there are requirements to be able
to update either image independently as well as to update them
together atomically, as specified in the associated manifests.
5.3. Symmetric Multiple CPUs
In more complex SoCs with symmetric multiprocessing support, advanced
operating systems, such as Linux, are often used. These SoCs
frequently use an external storage medium, such as raw NAND flash or
an embedded Multimedia Card (eMMC). Due to the higher quantity of
resources, these devices are often capable of storing multiple copies
of their firmware images and selecting the most appropriate one to
boot. Many SoCs also support bootloaders that are capable of
updating the firmware image; however, this is typically a last resort
because it requires the device to be held in the bootloader while the
new firmware is downloaded and installed, which results in downtime
for the device. Firmware updates in this class of device are
typically not done in place.
5.4. Dual CPU, Shared Memory
This configuration has two or more heterogeneous CPUs in a single SoC
that share memory (flash and RAM). Generally, there will be a
mechanism to prevent one CPU from unintentionally accessing memory
currently allocated to the other. Upgrades in this case will
typically be done by one of the CPUs and is similar to the single CPU
with secure mode.
5.5. Dual CPU, Other Bus
This configuration has two or more heterogeneous CPUs, each having
their own memory. There will be a communication channel between
them, but it will be used as a peripheral, not via shared memory. In
this case, each CPU will have to be responsible for its own firmware
upgrade. It is likely that one of the CPUs will be considered the
primary CPU and will direct the other CPU to do the upgrade. This
configuration is commonly used to offload specific work to other
CPUs. Firmware dependencies are similar to the other solutions
above: sometimes allowing only one image to be upgraded, other times
requiring several to be upgraded atomically. Because the updates are
happening on multiple CPUs, upgrading the two images atomically is
challenging.
6. Manifests
In order for a firmware consumer to apply an update, it has to make
several decisions using manifest-provided information and data
available on the device itself. For more detailed information and a
longer list of information elements in the manifest, consult the
information model specification [SUIT-INFO-MODEL], which offers
justifications for each element, and the manifest specification
[SUIT-MANIFEST] for details about how this information is included in
the manifest.
+==========================+=====================================+
| Decision | Information Elements |
+==========================+=====================================+
| Should I trust the | Trust anchors and authorization |
| author of the firmware? | policies on the device |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Has the firmware been | Digital signature and MAC covering |
| corrupted? | the firmware image |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Does the firmware update | Conditions with Vendor ID, Class |
| apply to this device? | ID, and Device ID |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Is the update older than | Sequence number in the manifest (1) |
| the active firmware? | |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| When should the device | Wait directive |
| apply the update? | |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| How should the device | Manifest commands |
| apply the update? | |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| What kind of firmware | Unpack algorithms to interpret a |
| binary is it? | format |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Where should the update | Dependencies on other manifests and |
| be obtained? | firmware image URI in the manifest |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Where should the | Storage location and component |
| firmware be stored? | identifier |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------+
Table 1: Example Firmware Update Decisions
(1): A device presented with an old but valid manifest and firmware
must not be tricked into installing such firmware since a
vulnerability in the old firmware image may allow an attacker
to gain control of the device.
Keeping the code size and complexity of a manifest parser small is
important for constrained IoT devices. Since the manifest parsing
code may also be used by the bootloader, it can be part of the
trusted computing base.
A manifest may be used to protect not only firmware images but also
configuration data such as network credentials or personalization
data related to the firmware or software. Personalization data
demonstrates the need for confidentiality to be maintained between
two or more stakeholders that deliver images to the same device.
Personalization data is used with TEEs, which benefit from a protocol
for managing the life cycle of TAs running inside a TEE. TEEs may
obtain TAs from different authors, and those TAs may require
personalization data, such as payment information, to be securely
conveyed to the TEE. The TA's author does not want to expose the
TA's code to any other stakeholder or third party. The user does not
want to expose the payment information to any other stakeholder or
third party.
7. Securing Firmware Updates
Using firmware updates to fix vulnerabilities in devices is
important, but securing this update mechanism is equally important
since security problems are exacerbated by the update mechanism. An
update is essentially authorized remote code execution, so any
security problems in the update process expose that remote code
execution system. Failure to secure the firmware update process will
help attackers take control of devices.
End-to-end security mechanisms are used to protect the firmware image
and the manifest. The following assumptions are made to allow the
firmware consumer to verify the received firmware image and manifest
before updating the software:
* Authentication ensures that the device can cryptographically
identify the author(s) creating firmware images and manifests.
Authenticated identities may be used as input to the authorization
process. Not all entities creating and signing manifests have the
same permissions. A device needs to determine whether the
requested action is indeed covered by the permission of the party
that signed the manifest. Informing the device about the
permissions of the different parties also happens in an out-of-
band fashion and is a duty of the Trust Provisioning Authority.
* Integrity protection ensures that no third party can modify the
manifest or the firmware image. To accept an update, a device
needs to verify the signature covering the manifest. There may be
one or multiple manifests that need to be validated, potentially
signed by different parties. The device needs to be in possession
of the trust anchors to verify those signatures. Installing trust
anchors to devices via the Trust Provisioning Authority happens in
an out-of-band fashion prior to the firmware update process.
* Confidentiality protection of the firmware image must be done in
such a way that no one aside from the intended firmware
consumer(s) and other authorized parties can decrypt it. The
information that is encrypted individually for each device/
recipient must be done in a way that is usable with Content
Distribution Networks (CDNs), bulk storage, and broadcast
protocols. For confidentiality protection of firmware images, the
author needs to be in possession of the certificate/public key or
a pre-shared key of a device. The use of confidentiality
protection of firmware images is optional.
A manifest specification must support different cryptographic
algorithms and algorithm extensibility. Moreover, since signature
schemes based on RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) may become
vulnerable to quantum-accelerated key extraction in the future,
unchangeable bootloader code in ROM is recommended to use post-
quantum secure signature schemes such as hash-based signatures
[RFC8778]. A bootloader author must carefully consider the service
lifetime of their product and the time horizon for quantum-
accelerated key extraction. At the time of writing, the worst-case
estimate for the time horizon to key extraction with quantum
acceleration is approximately 2030, based on current research
[quantum-factorization].
When a device obtains a monolithic firmware image from a single
author without any additional approval steps, the authorization flow
is relatively simple. However, there are other cases where more
complex policy decisions need to be made before updating a device.
In this architecture, the authorization policy is separated from the
underlying communication architecture. This is accomplished by
separating the entities from their permissions. For example, an
author may not have the authority to install a firmware image on a
device in critical infrastructure without the authorization of a
device operator. In this case, the device may be programmed to
reject firmware updates unless they are signed both by the firmware
author and by the device operator.
Alternatively, a device may trust precisely one entity that does all
permission management and coordination. This entity allows the
device to offload complex permissions calculations for the device.
8. Example
Figure 2 illustrates an example message flow for distributing a
firmware image to a device. The firmware and manifest are stored on
the same firmware server and distributed in a detached manner.
+--------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------------------+
| | | Firmware Server | | IoT Device |
| Author | | Status Tracker | | +------------+ +----------+ |
+--------+ | Server | | | Firmware | |Bootloader| |
| +-----------------+ | | Consumer | | | |
| | | +------------+ +----------+ |
| | | | | |
| | | +-----------------------+ |
| Create Firmware | | | Status Tracker Client | |
|--------------+ | | +-----------------------+ |
| | | `''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
|<-------------+ | | | |
| | | | |
| Upload Firmware | | | |
|------------------>| | | |
| | | | |
| Create Manifest | | | |
|---------------+ | | | |
| | | | | |
|<--------------+ | | | |
| | | | |
| Sign Manifest | | | |
|-------------+ | | | |
| | | | | |
|<------------+ | | | |
| | | | |
| Upload Manifest | | | |
|------------------>| Notification of | | |
| | new firmware image | | |
| |----------------------------->| |
| | | | |
| | |Initiate| |
| | | Update | |
| | |<-------| |
| | | | |
| | Query Manifest | | |
| |<--------------------| . |
| | | . |
| | Send Manifest | . |
| |-------------------->| . |
| | | Validate |
| | | Manifest |
| | |--------+ |
| | | | |
| | |<-------+ |
| | | . |
| | Request Firmware | . |
| |<--------------------| . |
| | | . |
| | Send Firmware | . |
| |-------------------->| . |
| | | Verify . |
| | | Firmware |
| | |--------+ |
| | | | |
| | |<-------+ |
| | | . |
| | | Store . |
| | | Firmware |
| | |--------+ |
| | | | |
| | |<-------+ |
| | | . |
| | | . |
| | | . |
| | | | |
| | | Update | |
| | |Complete| |
| | |------->| |
| | | |
| | Firmware Update Completed | |
| |<-----------------------------| |
| | | |
| | Reboot | |
| |----------------------------->| |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | |Reboot |
| | | |------>|
| | | | |
| | | . |
| | +---+----------------+--+
| | S| | | |
| | E| | Verify | |
| | C| | Firmware | |
| | U| | +--------------| |
| | R| | | | |
| | E| | +------------->| |
| | | | | |
| | B| | Activate new | |
| | O| | Firmware | |
| | O| | +--------------| |
| | T| | | | |
| | | | +------------->| |
| | P| | | |
| | R| | Boot new | |
| | O| | Firmware | |
| | C| | +--------------| |
| | E| | | | |
| | S| | +------------->| |
| | S| | | |
| | +---+----------------+--+
| | | . |
| | | | |
| | . | |
| | Device running new firmware | |
| |<-----------------------------| |
| | . | |
| | | |
Figure 2: First Example Flow for a Firmware Update
Figure 3 shows an exchange that starts with the status tracker
querying the device for its current firmware version. Later, a new
firmware version becomes available, and since this device is running
an older version, the status tracker server interacts with the device
to initiate an update.
The manifest and the firmware are stored on different servers in this
example. When the device processes the manifest, it learns where to
download the new firmware version. The firmware consumer downloads
the firmware image with the newer version X.Y.Z after successful
validation of the manifest. Subsequently, a reboot is initiated, and
the secure boot process starts. Finally, the device reports the
successful boot of the new firmware version.
+---------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------------------+
| Status | | Firmware Server | | +------------+ +----------+ |
| Tracker | | Status Tracker | | | Firmware | |Bootloader| |
| Server | | Server | | | Consumer | | | |
+---------+ +-----------------+ | | +Status | +----------+ |
| | | | Tracker | | |
| | | | Client | | |
| | | +------------+ | |
| | | | IoT Device | |
| | `''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
| | | |
| Query Firmware Version | |
|------------------------------------->| |
| Firmware Version A.B.C | |
|<-------------------------------------| |
| | | |
| <<some time later>> | |
| | | |
_,...._ _,...._ | |
,' `. ,' `. | |
| New | | New | | |
\ Manifest / \ Firmware / | |
`.._ _,,' `.._ _,,' | |
`'' `'' | |
| Push manifest | |
|----------------+-------------------->| |
| | | |
| ' | '
| | | Validate |
| | | Manifest |
| | |---------+ |
| | | | |
| | |<--------+ |
| | Request firmware | |
| | X.Y.Z | |
| |<--------------------| |
| | | |
| | Firmware X.Y.Z | |
| |-------------------->| |
| | | |
| | | Verify |
| | | Firmware |
| | |--------------+ |
| | | | |
| | |<-------------+ |
| | | |
| | | Store |
| | | Firmware |
| | |-------------+ |
| | | | |
| | |<------------+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | Trigger Reboot |
| | |--------------->|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | __..-------..._'
| | ,-' `-.
| | | Secure Boot |
| | `-. _/
| | |`--..._____,,.,-'
| | | |
| Device running firmware X.Y.Z | |
|<-------------------------------------| |
| | | |
| | | |
Figure 3: Second Example Flow for a Firmware Update
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. Security Considerations
This document describes the terminology, requirements, and an
architecture for firmware updates of IoT devices. The content of the
document is thereby focused on improving the security of IoT devices
via firmware update mechanisms and informs the standardization of a
manifest format.
An in-depth examination of the security considerations of the
architecture is presented in [SUIT-INFO-MODEL].
11. Informative References
[LwM2M] Open Mobile Alliance, "Lightweight Machine to Machine
Technical Specification", Version 1.0.2, February 2018,
<http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
V1_0_2-20180209-A/OMA-TS-LightweightM2M-
V1_0_2-20180209-A.pdf>.
[quantum-factorization]
Jiang, S., Britt, K.A., McCaskey, A.J., Humble, T.S., and
S. Kais, "Quantum Annealing for Prime Factorization",
Scientific Reports 8, December 2018,
<https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-36058-z>.
[RATS-ARCH]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
12, 23 April 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
ietf-rats-architecture-12>.
[RFC6024] Reddy, R. and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management
Requirements", RFC 6024, DOI 10.17487/RFC6024, October
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6024>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC8240] Tschofenig, H. and S. Farrell, "Report from the Internet
of Things Software Update (IoTSU) Workshop 2016",
RFC 8240, DOI 10.17487/RFC8240, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8240>.
[RFC8778] Housley, R., "Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature
Algorithm with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8778, DOI 10.17487/RFC8778, April 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8778>.
[SUIT-INFO-MODEL]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "A Manifest
Information Model for Firmware Updates in IoT Devices",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-
information-model-11, 6 April 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-suit-information-
model-11>.
[SUIT-MANIFEST]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg,
"A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-12, 22 February 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-suit-manifest-12>.
[TEEP-ARCH]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-architecture-14, 22 February 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-teep-architecture-
14>.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following individuals for their feedback:
* Geraint Luff
* Amyas Phillips
* Dan Ros
* Thomas Eichinger
* Michael Richardson
* Emmanuel Baccelli
* Ned Smith
* Jim Schaad
* Carsten Bormann
* Cullen Jennings
* Olaf Bergmann
* Suhas Nandakumar
* Phillip Hallam-Baker
* Marti Bolivar
* Andrzej Puzdrowski
* Markus Gueller
* Henk Birkholz
* Jintao Zhu
* Takeshi Takahashi
* Jacob Beningo
* Kathleen Moriarty
* Bob Briscoe
* Roman Danyliw
* Brian Carpenter
* Theresa Enghardt
* Rich Salz
* Mohit Sethi
* Éric Vyncke
* Alvaro Retana
* Barry Leiba
* Benjamin Kaduk
* Martin Duke
* Robert Wilton
We would also like to thank the WG chairs, Russ Housley, David
Waltermire, and Dave Thaler for their support and review.
Authors' Addresses
Brendan Moran
Arm Limited
Email: Brendan.Moran@arm.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Limited
Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
David Brown
Linaro
Email: david.brown@linaro.org
Milosch Meriac
Consultant
Email: milosch@meriac.com
